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C HAP T E R 23 
Public Utilities 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§23.1. Public utility rate regulation: Standards of judicial review in 
Massachusetts: Effects of inflation on the regulatory process: Significance 
of management prerogatives. The regulation of public utilities has al-
ways implied an effort: to keep prices down in the face of generally rising 
prices for the services which the utilities rendered. In the United States 
the legal question of whether, under the Constitution, the states had 
the power to regulate utilities was settled positively by the Supreme Court 
in Munn v. Illinois. 1 In this case a utility was described as private 
property imbued with a public interest.2 Immediately after the affirmation 
of the power of the states to regulate utilities, the courts dealt with the 
question of how the amount which utilities could charge would be 
determined. The Supreme Court decided that the methods used in 
determining the charges were very important in balancing the interests 
of the public and that of the private corporation in Smyth v. Ames.3 
Generally speaking, the proper level of utility revenues is determined by 
multiplying the dollar amount of the utility in service to the public by 
the rate of return judged "fair" in order to arrive at a total revenue 
figure. Under vhe Smyth v. Ames type of standard, the dollar amount 
of utility in service to the public is litigated and adjusted with respect 
to inflation and costs. The fair value of the utility in service, according 
to the Supreme Court, included original cost of construction, value of 
permanent improvements, market value of securities and other specific 
items on a company's books.4 This fair value standard is a composite of 
several different valuation methods which were all to be weighed by a 
court.5 Valuation of the plant and equipment became a fertile source of 
court appeals due to the uncertainty of the standards included in fair 
value and the fact that the valuation of plant and equipment usually is 
the largest part of any utility's total investment.6 State commissions 
§25.1. 1 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
2 Id. at 126. 
3 See 169 U.S. 466, modified in rehearing, 171 U.S. 361 (1898). 
4 169 U.S. at 546-47. 
5 P. GARFIELD AND W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 59-60 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Garfield and Lovejoy]. The problem is that actual cost may 
include either the historical cost, prudent investment or original cost method of 
computing valuation of plant facilities already in service. Each yields a different 
value depending on individual utility circumstances and the state of its books. Id. 
6 Garfield and Lovejoy at 56. 
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were generally bound to the fair value standard after 1898 and before 
1944.7 
In 1944 the Supreme Court retreated from the standards of Smyth by 
suggesting in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.8 that the result reached, and 
not the method employed, was most important in utility regulation cases.9 
The FPC (and by implication any state commission) was no longer 
obligated to use any particular method of valuation,lo Method of compu-
tation has therefore diminished as an issue in regulatory litigation. The 
actual impact of the rates is now more important than the theory which 
the regulatory commission applies to determine the rates. 11 The Hope 
decision freed states from federally imposed constitutional standards,12 
After Hope, many states abandoned the theory of fair value as a deter-
minant of public utility rates. However, during the late 1950's the 
number of fair value states was again rising,13 The rise in fair value 
states has been attributed to judicial recognition of inflation after World 
War 11.14 The inherent flexibility of the fair value method lends itself 
particularly to the need for fine inflationary adjustments. 
Massachusetts, on the other hand, has since 1914 adopted a form of 
prudent investment as its standard. 15 The prudent investment standard 
is predicated on the assumption that capital honestly and prudently in-
vested should generally yield a particular return. Utility rates are then set 
at a level which guarantees that the utility will receive the prescribed 
return on its invested capital. This implies that both the regulatory 
commission and the courts of Massachusetts prefer to adjust the rate of 
return when confronted with problems of inflation or cost. Since rate of 
return is less flexible than rate base as a mechanism for adjusting returns 
to compensate for inflation, decisions in Massachusetts show the strain 
of attempting to bend the theory to the economic reality of the times. 
The 1971 New England Telephone case illustrates problems which are 
implicit in Massachusetts rate making procedures for utilities at the 
present time. Following a brief description of the New England Telephone 
case, this paper will analyze judicial dominance of the utility regulation 
process as it has evolved in Massachusetts. Particular attention will ;be 
paid to the statutory basis of review and the Supreme Judicial Court's 
insistence on hearing evidence de novo in cases alleging confiscatory 
rates regardless of the statutory scheme. This paper will then discuss the 
7 Joslin & Miller, Public Utility Rate Regulation: A Re-Examination, 43 Va. 
L. Rev. 1027, 1030-31 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Joslin & Milled. 
8 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
9 Id. at 602. 
10 Id. The court cited with approval' FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 
U.S. 575 (1942). 
11 320 U.S. at 602; see Garfield & Lovejoy 73. 
12 Garfield and Lovejoy at 73. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 77. 
15 Id. at 74. 
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peculiar pressures exerted upon the regulatory scheme by the post-World 
War II inflationary trends, and will analyze problems which have arisen 
under the Massachusetts regulatory process in the light of those trends. 
Finally, it will be suggested that the Department of Public Utilities is 
in fact the most appropriate agency to evaluate the quality of manage-
ment in regulated utilities, a factor which should weigh heavily in the 
regulatory process. It will then be concluded that the judicial domination 
of public utilities regulation should not continue in Massachusetts because 
it tends to produce confusion, delay and inefficiency. 
1. NEW ENGLAND TEL. & TEL. Co. V. DEPT. OF PUB. UTILITIES.16 
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company (the Company) ap-
pealed certain orders and rulings issued June 10, 1970, by the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Utilities (the Department) on the Company's 
petition for a comprehensive tariff revision filed on July 15, 1969.17 The 
Department ordered New England Telephone not to put into effect the 
tariff which would produce $55,000,000 in additional revenues but rather 
to submit a new tariff tending to produce additional revenues of 
$7,713,000.18 The Company argued that the decision of the Department 
in rejecting the original tariff was confiscatory in nature and deprived 
New England Telephone "of its property and appropriate[d] the same 
to public uses without reasonable compensation and without due process 
of law, contrary to Articles X and XII of the Declaration of Rights of 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth."19 The decisional areas to which 
the Company objected included (1) the determination of rate base,20 
(2) the application of a hypothetical as opposed to actual capital struc-
ture in rate computations21 and (3) the allowance of certain expenses. 
16 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1613, 275 N.E.2d 493. 
17 Id., 275 N.E.2d at 497. 
18 Id. at 1614, 275 N.E.2d at 497. 
19 Id. at 1615, 275 N.E.2d at 498. 
20 The rate base is created by adding the value of plant in service and an 
allowance for working capital and may include various overhead costs. Garfield & 
Lovejoy at 56. Rate of return on the other hand tends to be a percentage de-
signed to yield a proper return on the net amount invested in the utility over a 
number of years. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 149-50, 
238-83 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bonbright]. 
21 Since the capital structure of any company is arrived at by discrete inputs 
over a long period of time, arguments about whether a company was wasteful in 
its choices of forms of financing center around whether a structure other than 
that on the books should be attributed toa company. Arguments over actual' and 
hypothetical capital structure occur because there is, at anyone point in time, 
a hypothetical capital structure which will minimize the costs of all capital to 
any company, and use of a hypothetical caphal structure by a public utilities 
commission may lower the overall costs of capital which may be presented at a 
regulatory hearing and thereby necessitate a lesser rate of return. Garfield & 
Lovejoy at 128-31. The Company objected to both parts of the standard regula-
tory equation, i.e. rate base x rate of return = revenues. 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
3
Jozefek: Chapter 23: Public Utilities
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§23.1 PUBLIC UTILITIES 649 
The Company raised several objections to the Department's determina-
tion of rate base. The first involved the disallowance of the Company's 
claim that the year-end dollar amount of physical plant in service should 
be used as part of the rate base as opposed to an average test-year22 
figure. The Company argued that the year-end amount was necessary 
to protect it from erosion of its rate base and subsequent attrition of its 
rate of return as a result of inflation.23 Inflation allegedly caused invest-
ment and expenses to grow faster than revenues. Therefore, the Company 
contended that the year-end figures more accurately represented the 
actual investment of the company.24 Since the Department had histori-
cally used the average plant investment over the test year in computing 
the rate base,25 the Supreme Judicial Court held that it was a discretion-
ary matter for the Department to use average plant investment as the 
criterion unless "that particular practice resulted in rates which are con-
fiscatory."26 
Closely allied with the above allegation was the Company's claim that 
the total amount of plant under construction should be included in the 
rate base at the amount reached at year-end. The Department permitted 
the Company to add to the rate base only the interest or similar cost 
of capital used for the new plant until it actually went into service.27 
Citing the fact that there is a considerable split among jurisdictions on 
how this sort of problem should be treated,28 the Court held that no 
constitutional principle required the Department to use the value of 
the plant under construction rather than the cost of capital to determine 
the rate base during construction.29 
The Company also contended that money on deposit with various 
banks should be included in the rate base. The Court sustained the De-
partment's finding that the Company had not sustained the burden of 
proof of showing how much of the aggregate amount was held in banks 
to avoid paying service charges to the banks ('an amount includable in 
rate base) and how much represented money accumulated for payment 
1616, 275 N.E.2d at 498-99; see Parker, The Regulation of Public Utilities, 10 
Natural Resources J. 827, 828 (1970). See generally Garfield & Lovejoy at 1-27. 
22 A test year is a period of representative costs which are expected to occur 
in the future. Garfield & Lovejoy at 252. 
23 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1617, 275 N.E.2d at 499. 
24 Id. 
25 See cases collected, Id. at 1619 n.6, 275 N.E.2d at 500 n.6. 
26 Id. at 1619, 275 N.E.2d at 501. A confiscatory resullt might arise where 
hypothetical utility Y, owner of average plant investment of $10,000,000 over 
the test year, put into operation plant facilities totaling an additional $10,000,000 
at the very end of the test year. 
27 Id. at 1620, 275 N.E.2d at 501. 
28 Id. at 1622 nn.l0 & 11, 275 N.E.2d at 502 nn.lD & 11. 
29 Id. at 1622, 275 N.E.2d at 503. 
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of dividends, plant construction or the payment of interest (amounts 
not includable in rate base) .30 
The Company further refused to deduct the amounts of the federal 
investment tax credit which it received from its basis in plant and equip-
ment in the years in which it received 'the credits. Instead, the Company 
placed the amount of the investment credit into a reserve account of 
"unamortized investment tax credit" which it then deducted yearly from 
its basis, predicating the deductable amounts on the yearly proportion of 
the total useful life of the article for which the original investment credit 
had been obtained.31 The result of this accounting method was to defer 
the reduction in rate base and give the Company both a larger rate 
base 'and the use of 'the money not paid in taxes. This would produce a 
double return. The Court held that deferral of the reduction in rate 
base, while an acceptable accounting practice, was not justifiable given 
the regulatory context in which it occurred.32 
The rate of return portion of the regulatory formula was appealed on 
two general grounds. The first involved the application of an actual as 
opposed to a hypothetical debt-eqUlity ratio while the second concerned 
the determination of actual cost of debt and equity capital and therefore 
the actual rate of return which the Company was to receive as a result 
of this particular round of rate hearings. Although the Court had pre-
viously upheld the Department's use of hypothetical debt-equity ratios33 
it noted that the use of hypothetical as opposed to actual debt-equity 
ratios was an issue to be decided on the facts ·of each case.34 In the 
particular case, this determination by the Court meant that the Com-
pany's planned move to a position of 45% of total capital as debt (which 
took place on September 1, 1970) was a factor which had to be re-
flected in the Department's assignment of debt-equity ratio.35 The Court 
found that the 45% debt ratio was within a range of reasonableness and 
the Company should not be penalized by an assumption of a 50% debt 
ratio by the Department.36 The Court rejected the Department's conten-
tion that the Company's previous issue of equity in a period of relatively 
low debt interest rates while issuing $175,000,000 worth of debentures in 
a period of relatively high debt interest rates was questionable within 
a regulatory context. 
The Department made its determination of the cost of debt capital 
30 Id. at 1626, 275 N.E.2d at 504-05. 
31 Id. at 1626-27, 275 N.E.2d at 505. 
32 Id. at 1627-28, 275 N.E.2d at 505-06. 
33 Id. at 1629, 275 N.E.2d at 506. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1630-33, 275 N.E.2d at 507-09. 
36 Id. at 1633-34, 275 N.E.2d at 509. When a 50% debt ratio is attributed to 
a firm whose actual ratio is 45%, the 5% difference between the two figures 
means that the firm has 5% less equity capital cost attributed to it and there-
fore will have a total cost which is less than its actual cost for capital, since debt 
as a rule has a lower cost than equity does. 
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before the actual issue of the $175,000,000 of long-term debt. It used 
the testimony of the witnesses before it, who were unanimous in their 
opinion that the proposed debt issue would cost 8%. Actual cost for the 
issue was 8.73%.37 Since new evidence can be introduced during judicial 
review of rate cases,38 the 8.73% figure, the Court held, had to be taken 
into account for the determination of the cost of all long-term debt of 
New England Telephone. Composite cost for debt is an actual figure in 
the Court's decision. 
The Company questioned whether the figure of 9.9% return on equity 
capital was a fair rate of return and above the line of confiscation. The 
Court held that it was not.39 The Court expressed displeasure over the fact 
that the Department, the finder of fact in the case, was also statutorily 
empowered to call its own witnesses as if it were one of the adversaries 
in the case.4O Although the Department had called only one witness 
according to the Court and the Company had called three witnesses 
on the matter of the proper rate of return upon equity capital, the De-
partment consistently followed the figures which its own witness produced 
on return for both equity capital and a figure for composite return on 
capita1.41 Although the Court did not base its decision on any single 
factor, it is clear that the failure of recent stock offerings by New En-
land Telephone to produce anticipated capital was also a major factor 
in the Court holding "that a return of nothing less than 11 % on equity 
capital will be sufficient to attract new stock capital to the Company at 
its actual debt ratio of about 45%."42 The Court then applied the capital 
costs which it had determined to the Company's actual capital structure 
and computed the minimum composite cost of capital to be 8.615%.43 
On a number of expense items used in computing the rate base, the 
Company successfully cha1lenged the figures allowed by the Department. 
The Supreme Judicial Court required the Department to determine and 
consider the amount of expected or known change in federal income 
taxes, Social Security taxes, municipal taxes and wages.44 Furthermore, 
the Department had disallowed a portion of the Company's advertising 
expense on the grounds that it was designed to improve the image of 
the company rather than provide information to consumers.45 Since 
there was "no finding by the Department that the total amount spent 
for advertising is more than reasonably necessary,"46 the Court held that 
the Department should not question the judgment of management that 
37 Id. at 1635, 275 N.E.2d at 510. 
38 G.L., c. 25, §5. 
39 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1640, 275 N.E.2d at 512-13. 
40 Id. at 1640-41, 275 N.E.2d at 513. 
41 Id. at 1641-42, 275 N.E.2d at 513. 
42 Id. at 1643, 275 N.E.2d at 514. 
43 Id. at 1644, 275 N.E.2d at 515. 
44 Id. at 1645-47, 275 N.E.2d at 515-17. 
45 Id. at 1648, 275 N.E.2d at 517. 
46 Id. at 1648, 275 N.E.2d at 517. 
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the advertising expenses were a cost of good service.47 Similarly, the 
Court found that charitable contributions, disallowed by the Department, 
were a proper operating expense if reasonable in amount.43 . 
In its appeal, the Company put pressure upon the whole regulatory 
equation. It asked for upward reevaluation in rate base and rate of re-
turn, arguing that its revenues were not yielding a sufficient return for 
the amounts invested in the public service. Basic to these claims was 
the decision by the Company that it had been adversely affected in the 
public service by increased costs caused by general economic conditions. 
In its search for what it considered the proper level of return the Com-
pany encountered the Department, seemingly statutorily entrusted with 
the task of overseeing utilities' profits and efficiencies in the interests of 
the public. Both the Company and the Department implicitly based their 
opposing views of the treatment of inflation and its sub-issue of utility 
efficiency on the Massachusetts statutes dealing with utility regulation. 
As will be later seen, the statute covering judicial review of Department 
decisions, Mass. G.L., c. 25, §5, has had a unique interpretation by the 
Supreme Judicial Court which underlies the interpretation of inflation 
arguments inevitably made by the Company and attempts to adjust 
Company efficiency assayed by the Department. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RATE MAKING 
The limits of judicial review of administrative rate making in Massa-
chusetts have to a large extent been governed by the interpretation of 
G.L., c. 25, §5 [the Statute]. This judicial interpretation of this statute 
has produced a peculiar standard of review, perhaps unique to Massa-
chusetts, which has strongly encouraged appeals from Department de-
cisions. An early version of the Statute provided that "[t]he supreme 
judicial court shall have jurisdiction in equity to review ... but only to 
the extent of the unlawfulness of such ruling or order .... "49 In Lowell 
Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities,5o the gas company sued in 
equity to amend a rate order of the Department on the grounds that the 
order was confiscatory and unlawful. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the Statute did not bar the Court from hearing new evidence and 
reviewing findings of fact in cases where constitutional rights are in-
volved.51 In a subsequent Opinion of the Justices concerning the constitu· 
tionality of compulsory automobile insurance, the Court reiterated its 
position: 
47 Id. at 1648-50, 275 N.E.2d at 517-18. 
43 Id. at 1654-55, 275 N.E.2d at 521. 
49 G.L., c. 25, §5 (1932 Ter. Ed.). This Section was substantially revised in 
1953. See text at note 78, supra. 
50 324 Mass. 80,84 N.E.2d 811, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949). 
S1 Id. at 86, 84 N.E.2d at 815. See also Segal, Administrative Procedure in 
Massachusetts: Rule Making and Judicial Review, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 21 (1953) 
[hereinafter cited as Segall. 
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A fundamental principle of rate making by public authority is that 
in general the rate so established must be sufficient to yield a fair 
return on the reasonalble value of the property used or invested for 
doing the business after paying costs and carrying charges. Rates not 
sufficient to yield such return are unjust, unreasonable and confisca-
tory .... The making of rates may be treated as a legislative or 
executive function. "In all such cases, if the owner claims confisca-
tion of his property will result, the State must provide a fair op-
portunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for deter-
mination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and 
facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due 
process clause .... "52 (Emphasis added). 
The Court thereby rejected the usual standards of judicial review of 
administrative decisions53 and adopted, where confiscation of property 
is alleged, the view of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio Valley 
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough.54 According to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the Ben Avon doctrine applied equally to Articles I, X and XI 
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution in the 
utility regulation context.55 
In 1928, the Court made it clear that the Statute did not permit 
appellants to introduce new evidence in an attempt solely to reverse 
findings of fact by the Department of Public Utilities. 56 However, if 
the appellant wished to make a claim of right under the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth, he could introduce evidence not presented before 
the Department to support that claim.57 Twenty years later, despite 
arguments that the United States Supreme Court had vitiated the Ben 
Avon doctrine by its decision in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natu-
ral Gas Co.,58 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld its earlier rule: since 
its past decisions in the field of rate regulation in Massachusetts rested 
on the Declaration of Rights, any change in the Ben Avon rule did not 
affect Massachusetts rulings.59 The Court further stated that when con-
stitutional rights respecting rates were involved, the rule that the Court 
could not review or revise "pure findings of fact" by the Department 
of Public Utilities would not apply. 60 This stand on utility rate regula-
52 251 Mass. 569, 610-11, 147 N.E. 680, 700 (1925), quoting Ohio Valley 
Water Co. c. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920). 
53 See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§29.02-29.07 
(Supp. 1970). 
54 253 U.S. 287 (1920). 
55 251 Mass. at 611, 147 N.E. at 700. 
56 New England Tel'. Be Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 262 Mass. 137, 141-
42, 159 N.E. 743, 745 (1928). 
57 Id. at 142, 159 N.E. at 745. 
58 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
59 Lowell Gas Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 89, 84 N.E.2d 811, 
817 (1949). 
60 Id. at 84-85, 84 N.E.2d at 814. 
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tion conflicted with the position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
other administrative areas, not involving constitutional claims, during 
the same period.61 
The Supreme Judicial Court illustrated the theory of confiscation 
which grew out of the Declaration of Rights in a series of cases which 
were part of the country-wide round of Bell System rate cases in the 
late 1940's.62 In New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dept. of 
Pub. Utilities,63 the central case in Massachusetts, (hereinafter the 1951 
Telephone case) the parties had stipulated the facts which were to 
come before the Court.54 After analyzing its concept of judicial review 
in connection with the rate case before it and drawing heavily upon its 
reasoning in Lowell Gas,65 the Court said: 
It is elementary that the fixing of rates is not a proper judicial 
function. On the other hand, where a rate established by a public 
regulatory body is attacked as confiscatory the Constitution of this 
Commonwealth and seemingly still that of the United States require 
that there be a full opportunity for judicial review as to both fact 
and law .... It is the contention of the company here that the rates 
set up by the order of the department . . . do not permit a fair 
return upon the property of the company devoted to the public 
service and are confiscatory. That issue is before us in all its aspects.66 
Although the Court reiterated that it was beyond its power to fix rates, 
the Court was adamant in its statement that it would investigate all 
aspects of the confiscation issue raised by New England Telephone. The 
Court stated that it had a duty 
to draw to the best of our ability the line where confiscation begins, 
and in the circumstances of this case, in order to make our decision 
as useful as possible and not merely the starting point of a series 
of attempts to ascertain by the method of trial and error just what 
figure this court would allow to stand, it seems that we should state 
where in our judgment on the evidence before us that line must be 
drawn.67 
61 Segal at 21. 
62 The various operating companies of the Bell System went through a series of 
requests for higher rates brought about in part by the form of financing practiced 
by American Telephone in the 1940's and by the demand for service at this 
period. See Rose, The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases, 37 Va. L. Rev. 699 
( 1951); Garfield & Lo ve joy 446-63. The appeals stemming from New England 
Telephone's 1948 rate request are: Dept. of Pub. Utilities v. New England Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 325 Mass. 281, 90 N.E.2d 328 (1950); New England Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Dept of Pub. Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 97 N.E.2d 509 (1951); New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 331 Mass. 604, 121 N.E.2d 896 (1954). 
63 327 Mass. 81, 97 N.E.2d 509 (1951). 
54 Id. at 84, 97 N.E.2d at 511-12. 
65 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949). 
66 327 Mass. at 85-86, 97 N.E.2d at 512. 
67 Id. at 95, 97 N.E.2d at 517. 
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Even where the parties had stipulated the facts which had been intro-
duced below, the Supreme Judicial Court still felt compelled to delineate 
the minimum rates which should be allowed New England Telephone 
and it insisted on additional evidence to facilitate that detennination. 
Despite the 1925 interpretation of the Statute as the remedy to an 
owner pleading confiscation of his property, the judgment in the 1951 
Telephone case confinned the proposition that whenever unconstitutional 
confiscation of rates was pleaded by the utility company, the presence 
or the absence of mere statutory powers to review the decisions of the 
Department were irrelevant. Indeed, the Court went further in the 1951 
Telephone case in discussing G.L., c. 25, §5 in terms of its effect solely 
as a remedy against the Department of Public Utilities. Investigating the 
construction of the Statute, the Court decided that the word "modify" 
enabled it to rewrite directly the Department's original order without 
sending the case back to the Department for rehearing.68 G.L., c. 25, 
§5 thereby speeded up the final disposition of a successful utility rate 
fight following judicial review. Therefore, the Company saved time and 
did not have to refile under the rate decision of the Court.69 
The Department had anticipated the result in the 1951 Telephone case 
after the decision in Lowell Gas. The Department correctly reasoned 
that the introduction of an allegation of unconstitutional confiscation 
could consistently reduce the Department to the status of an easily cir-
cumvented body. Under the Lowell Gas rationale the Department could 
statutorily only delay the ultimate hearing and decision before the dissatis-
fied public utility appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court on the grounds 
of confiscation of its property. While the 1951 Telephone case was being 
fought, the Department reacted to the Lowell Gas case by filing legisla-
tion in 1949 and 1950 designed to change the scope of review of Depart-
ment decisions.7o In 1950, the annual message of the Governor attacked 
the Court interpretation of the regulatory appeals process, characterizing 
it as a basic defect in the law and suggesting that with such a process 
Department control over public utility rates was futile.71 The Governor 
advocated that findings of fact by the Department should be final, for 
under the rule of the Lowell Gas case, the public utility had everything 
to gain and nothing to lose by not acceding to a Department rate de-
cision.71 Despite support from the Governor, the legislation filed by the 
Department died in the Senate in both 1949 and 1950,12 At its next 
filing, the Department signified that it was willing to omit provisions it 
had previously insisted upon: specifically, a proposal that facts supported 
by substantial evidence 'be treated as conclusive.73 But the Department 
68 Id. at 99-101, 84 N.E.2d at 519-20. 
69 1951 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 85. 
70 1950 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No.1, 49-51. 
71 1950 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No.1, 50-51. 
72 1951 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 85, 2-3. 
73 1951 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 85, 2-3. 
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insisted that if the Lowell Gas rule were allowed to stand, then this rule 
"would relegate the functions of the [Department] to a mere testing 
ground for the legality or illegality of proposals by these companies."74 
This expansive interpretation of the guarantees against confiscation, which 
the Department attempted to change, goes far beyond the usual bounds 
of due process which other courts use in connection with review of ad-
ministrative agency decisions.75 The 1951 recommendation by the De-
partment elicited a request for an advisory opinion and a consolidation 
of the Court's position. 
It, therefore, was entirely consistent for the Supreme Judicial Court 
to suggest in that advisory opinion one year after the 1951 Telephone 
decision that 
there is no constitutional requirement, even in a case involving a 
claim of confiscation or of other violation of constitutional right, 
as to the precise method by which the court must review a com-
mission's finding of fact, provided the method is fully adequate to 
enable the reviewing court to make certain that it has before it all 
available pertinent evidence on the constitutional issue and provided 
that, as to that issue, the court is free to act upon its own independent 
judgment as to both law and fact.76 
Since the Court had determined in the 1951 Telephone case that G.L., 
c. 25, §5 is irrelevant in cases involving claims of confiscation and there-
fore that the evidentiary restrictions imposed by Section 5 did not apply, 
the Court still insisted in the 1951 advisory opinion that it had to be 
free to act both on law and fact in a confiscation case and that the final 
determination of confiscation was a judicial question.77 
In 1953, the General Court sought to restrict review by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in these cases solely to matters of law.78 G.L., c. 25, §5 
as amended provides that 
No evidence beyond that contained in the record shall be intro-
duced before the court, except that in cases where issues of confisca-
tion or of constitutional rights are involved the court may order 
such additional evidence as it deems necessary for the determination 
of such issues to be taken before the commission and to be adduced 
at the hearing in such a manner and upon such terms and conditions 
as to t!he court may seem proper.79 
The legislature further provided that the burden of proof would be on 
the appellant to show that Department decisions were erroneous and 
74 1951 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 85, 3. 
75 Segal at 22-23 & nn. 77 -85; Garfield & Lovejoy at 40-43. 
76 328 Mass. 679, 687, 106 N.E.2d 259, 264, (1952). 
77 Id. at 683, 106 N.E.2d at 262. 
78 Acts of 1953, c. 575 amending G.L., c. 25, §5. 
79 G.L., c. 25, §5. 
11
Jozefek: Chapter 23: Public Utilities
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§23.1 PUBLIC UTILITmS 657 
that no evidence was to be introduced on appeal except that evidence 
already on the record before the Department.so 
On its face, the Statute as amended appeared to prohibit judicial 
review of the Department's findings of fact and the admission of new 
evidence on appeal. In practice, however, the scope of judicial review 
was unchanged. The Supreme Judicial Court's insistence on complete 
discretion to review both law and fact on appeals involving constitutional 
rights makes the Statute as amended meaningless. It should be noted 
that the utility companies have consistently pleaded confiscation in appeals 
from Department rate making decisions. In basing the scope of its review 
on constitutional grounds, the Court has effectively precluded the possi-
bility of limiting that scope except with the Court's own acquiescence, or 
by constitutional amendment. It is submitted that the historical existence 
of a statute in Massachusetts which originally permitted the adducement 
of new evidence before the Court coupled with the subsequent judicial in-
terpretations of Article X of the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts 
has severely weakened the powers of the Department to regulate utilities 
and has also prolonged the battles over rates which almost inevitably wind 
up before the Court. The initial Department decision rarely stands. The 
1953 amendments to the review statute did not materially alter this 
situation, and it remained vulnerable to the same interpretation it had 
been designed to restrict. The 1971 round of rate appeals bear this out. 
Recent utilities regulation cases appealed before the Supreme Judicial 
Court have shown the utilities careful to plead the issue of confiscation.81 
Furthermore, the Boston Gas case, the Mystic Valley Gas case as well as 
the 1971 Telephone case have in common significant time lags between 
original test years and the date evidence was offered to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court. The existence of a considerable period of time between the 
original test year upon which a Department decision is based and the time 
when a final appeal of a confiscation case is decided means that the Court 
does not review the rates on the basis of the evidence which the Depart-
ment originally worked with. Rather, the Court may 'consider actual 
facts which may not have been predictable by the Department. The Court 
recognized this problem in 1949.82 
It is clear that the Court, despite protestations that it is doing nothing 
of the sort, is actually indulging in rate making by defining the border 
between confiscation and fair rate. The amended form of G.L., c. 25, 
§5 becomes irrelevant when the Court is concerned with a claim of con-
fiscation. In answer to an objection by the Department of Public Utilities 
80Id. 
81 New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 1971 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1613, 1615, 275 N.E.2d 493, 498; Boston Gas Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 614, 269 N.E.2d 248, 252. 
82 Lowell Gas Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 89, 84 N.E.2d 811, 
817 (1949). 
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that the evidence being used in Boston Gas had not been adduced before 
the Department the Court recently claimed that: 
[t]he third argument [dealing with non-hearing of evidence before 
the Department as set forth in the statute] is rendered irrelevant 
because we direct the D.P.U. to verify the evidence, at further rate 
hearings if necessary, and, if verified, to take it into account there-
after in accordance with principles stated in this opinion.83 
On the one hand this attitude on the part of the Court can be de-
fended as an expression of impatience with the delays created by appeals 
from regulatory cases. On the other hand, this attitude emphasizes the 
relative lack of power of the Department when dealing with utility com-
panies seeking higher rates. Despite the revised statute, the Court still 
deals with confiscation cases as if all evidence could be introduced before 
it in the first instance. Although the statute purports to limit the Court's 
jurisdiction to hear new evidence, the Court still finds it advisable to 
set itself up as the primary body in the area of rate regulation once an 
appeal has been initiated. The Department appears to function as a 
rubber stamp upon the remand of a case which the Court has actually 
decided. 
The Supreme Judicial Court applied this theory to the 1971 Telephone 
case. In this case, as in other recent utility cases, the Department is 
charged with knowledge at the time of its initial decision of what will 
happen in the intervening time 'between the rate decision and the ulti-
mate decision by the Court. In fact, the Department was penalized for 
having guessed the economic conditions which would actually transpire. 
A review by the Court is less a review of the decision which the De-
partment made on the basis of the test year originally presented to them 
and more a review of whether the Department's projections matched 
the facts as they subsequently unfolded. Evidence which has been pro-
duced before the Supreme Judicial Court and upon which the Court 
has made its decision is verified by the Department upon remand by the 
Court.84 Since the Court, it is assumed, does not pretend to expertise 
in the area of rate regulation, the accuracy of the evidence before it 
and its interpretation is presumed by the Court. The premise of expertise 
is implicit in the original act of the legislature creating a commission to 
oversee utilities rather than leaving the problem to the courts as a 
primary matter. 
III. PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION IN AN INFLATIONARY PERIOD 
Regulation of utilities in general is a phenomenon which first occurred 
in the nineteenth century. The Supreme Court of the United States first 
acknowledged the power of the states to regulate rates in 1877 in Munn 
83 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 613 n.6, 269 N.E.2d at 252 n.6. 
84 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1615, 275 N.E.2d at 498. 
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v. Illinois.85 Because utility regulation originated in the nineteenth cen-
tury, a period of relatively stable and even arguably decreasing prices,86 
utility regulation itself is predicated upon an assumption of stable eco-
nomic conditions.87 By the end of the nineteenth century, new natural 
monopolies in electrical, gas and telephone service had sprung up which 
were regulated under the state police powers first exposed by Munn v. 
Illinois. These public utilities were also initially regulated in periods of 
little inflation or of actual deflation.88 The post-World War II economic 
world did not retain the characteristic of stable price patterns which 
originally faced public utilities and their regulators. There has been vary-
ing inflation since World War II coupled with large scale expansion 
among the public utilities due to an increased demand for utility services 
derived from a generally better standard of living.89 
. The post-World War II inflation has affected all regulated utilities. 
In the case of telephone service, the substantial growth of the demand 
for telephone services which had built up during the war90 required 
significant expansion by the telephone companies. Rapid growth on the 
part of a regulated utility makes it necessary for repeated trips to the 
capital market.91 Inflation combined with company expansion means 
that there are substantially higher costs with the addition of plant facilities 
while the revenues of a regulated firm tend to remain steady. This is so 
because the regulated utility is not free to raise its prices in response to 
higher costs as non-regulated firms are.92 
Inflation causes two essential problems: regulatory lag and higher 
capital cost for each consumer of the utility service. The utility regulators 
have fashioned several new methods by which they may compensate for 
the inflationary component of economic life which has continued since 
World War II. They are (1) compensation for regulatory lag; (2) 
adequate allowance for depreciation (where replacement cost exceeds 
the original cost of equipment); (3) allowance of a higher dollar return 
on capital investment to offset lowered dollar purchasing power; and 
(4) periodic revision of individual rate schedules to bring these into line 
with current prices of substitute products or services.93 In other words, 
the utility must be allowed additional operating revenues if it has shown 
either that (a) its rising costs have exceeded previous allowances for 
revenue, or (b) its current revenues are based on a formula which was 
85 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
86 See generally M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963). 
87 Joslin & Miller at 1034 n.34. 
88 Id. at 1033. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Morrissey, Relation of Growth and Rate of Return for Utilities, 60 Pub. 
Utilities, Fortnightly 361, 362 (1957). 
92 Id. at 363. 
93 Bonbright, Public Utility Rate Control in a Period of Price Inflation, 27 
Land Econ. 16 (1951). 
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admittedly out of date at the time of its allowance because of a time 
lag between the original rate request and the regulator's final decision. 
Once it has been determined that the utility was adversely affected in 
some way by inflation and that it needs additional revenues, the problem 
is one of devising the rationale which will fit the allowance of revenues. 
Analytically, the rationale can only stem from solutions (2), (3) or (4) 
above. Anyone or combination of these may satisfactorily arrive at an 
allowance of additional revenue. However, political results may vary 
with the alternatives adopted.94 In Massachusetts, any argument over 
the effects of inflation on rate making devolves into a discussion of the 
effects of regulatory lag and the need for a higher dollar return on capital 
investment. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court, in the 1954 Tele-
phone case rejected the Company's contention that in periods of in-
flation the fair value of the company's investment should be a major 
part of the rate making procedure.95 The rejection of fair value96 was 
of course based on a decision by the Department, made at some early 
point in the history of utility regulation, to make a policy choice in 
favor of original cost.97 Most adjustments for inflation are therefore made 
94 For example, alternative (2) changes the rate base figures in the general 
regulatory equation, i.e., tariff per consumer = (rate base x rate of return) -+-
number of consumers (assuming a simple situation with one flat tariff for each 
discrete customer). Alternative (3) changes the rate of return figure. Both (2 ) 
and (3) have the tendency to supply the illusion to the consumer and other ob-
servers that an across-the-board change is taking place in the rates charged. On 
the other hand, alternative (4) adjusts the portion of the equation relating to 
the tariff per consumer end of the equation and tends to cause political problems 
if used since it can easily be perceived as a selective means of raising revenues. 
95 The Court quoted a previous case, Donham v. Public Service Commissioners, 
232 Mass. 309, 313, 122 N.E. 397, 399 (1919): "The rule established ... is 
that under the Massachusetts law 'capital honestly and prudently invested must 
under norma] conditions, be taken as the controlling factor in fixing the basis 
far computing fair and reasonable rates,' and that 'such rates are to be allowed as 
will yield a fair return upon such investments.''' New England Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 331 Mass. 604, 614, 121 N.E.2d 896, 902 (1954). 
The Court later states that "In this state of the authorities we shall not adopt 
at this relatively late date a construction of the Constitution of this Common-
wealth which compels the use of any particular theory ... for determining a rate 
base ... We would not be justified in laying hold of any part of our fundamental 
law for the purpose of overriding the department merely because a particular 
approach to rate regulation was not used." Id. at 616, 121 N.E.2d at 903. 
96 Fair value is a method of determining rate base associated with Smyth v. 
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) which considers depreciation, actual cost and re-
production cost new less depreciation, with each input being weighted. Garfield & 
Lovejoy at 57. 
97 There is a problem here in that it is difficult to tell from the opinions what 
the Court feels is the actual regulatory theory which the Department is functioning 
under. For example, in the 1954 Telephone case, the Court equates the prudent 
investment theory with that of original cost. 331 Mass. at 616 n.1, 121 N.E.2d 
403 n.10. However, Garfield & Lovejoy define the prudent investment theory 
and the original cost theory as two separate ways of working with facts. In this 
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within the figures for the rate of return. Among theorists the dispute 
centers on the question of whether the fair return on capital theory, or 
the payment of enough revenues in order to fairly "hire" utility capital, 
should include some sort of an adjustment upward for the ravages of 
inflation, esptdally in light of the fact that investors in other forms of 
securities do not have the opportunity to make inflationary adjustments.98 
Massachusetts decisions do not directly consider these factors, but the 
theories are constantly in the background of Massachusetts regulation. 
The Massachusetts decisions do consider the regulatory lag argument 
and the necessity to compensate investors for the slippage which has 
occurred in the value of their investment in order to continue attracting 
further investors as capital sources for the utilities. The Court's interpre-
tation of G.L., c. 25, §5 compliments the Court's perception of the needs 
of regulated utilities during periods of inflation. Since the Court will not 
hear cases solely on the basis of the evidence presented before the De-
partment, the introduction of new evidence upon a confiscation charge is 
actually part of the introduction of an inflation adjustment argument. 
Thus, the Court has said that 
inquiry ... on the issue of confiscation is not confined to the findings 
of the department or to the evidence introduced before the depart-
ment .... A determination of rates is necessarily made in large part 
upon a view taken through the dim lenses of prophecy. When a rate 
order is challenged on constitutional grounds in this court, our ob-
servations must be undertaken with the improved vision of inter-
vening experience.99 
The Court is obviously concerned with the problems which occur as a 
result of regulatory lag. There is some question whether the intervening 
experience fosters improved vision or justifies continued use of the de 
novo power of the Court to review regulatory cases. In 1952 the Court 
justified its insistence on the preservation of the right to introduce new 
evidence in a confiscation case by arguing that: 
in view of the inevitable delays sometimes encountered in the de-
system, original cost is the total investment cost of constructed and acquired 
property when first devoted to public service, less depreciation. Prudent invest-
ment, on the other hand, is the historical cost (defined as the construction and 
acquisition costs including additions and betterments, less depreciation), less any 
amounts which are wasteful or dishonest. Prudent investment carries an assumption 
that the utility has not been wasteful or dishonest. Garfield & Lovejoy at 57. 
98 For the proposition that there should be upward adjustments for inflation, 
see Morton, Rate of Return and the Value of Money in Public Utilities, 28 Land 
Econ. 91 (1952); see also numerous articles in Public Utilities Fortnightly; contra, 
Clemens, Some Aspects of the Rate-of-Return Problem, 30 Land Econ. 32 
(1954); Thatcher, Cost-of-Capital Techniques Employed in Determining the 
Rate of Return for Public Utilities, 30 Land Econ. 85 (1954). 
99 Lowell Gas. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 89, 84 N.E.2d 
811,817 (1949). 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 26
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/26
662 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §23.1 
cision of these cases, especially in times of rapidly changing costs, 
the court might sometimes be compelled to decide upon evidence 
already outdated and no longer applicable to the existing situation. 
Moreover, intervening e:x:perience may furnish the very best guide 
and should not be excluded from consideration, especially where 
violation of the Constitution is at stake.1oo 
Regrettably, this sort of regulatory lag argument is not consistent with 
the fact that the Department and the Court agree that Massachusetts is 
an original cost jurisdiction which does not take into consideration re-
production cost and only tries to determine what should be the proper 
return to induce the prudent investor to supply capital. The concepts 
of original cost and the test year however, assume a relatively stable 
price system. These conditions do not exist at the present. The original 
cost theory further assumes that the rates which are finally set will have 
enough of a buffer built in that any subsequent increase will not hurt 
the utility. The buffer does not work under the present system because 
the Court insists on giving the minimum rate of return which the utility 
may have. The Department tends to use this minimum rate as the basis 
fOIi its further decision and therefore refuses to build in any extra com-
pensation to protect the utility against the further course of inflation. 
Thus, unless the utility places some buffering in the figures which it 
presents to the Department or is purposefully inefficient in the test year 
operation in anticipation of this sort of situation (neither of which is 
supposed to be encouraged by the regulatory system), the utility will be 
forced to come up for rate adjustments over shorter periods of time in 
order to retain a relatively stable earnings picture. The Court, on the 
other hand, with its insistence upon the introduction of new evidence 
through G.L., c. 25, §5 is more realistic in assuming the existence of a 
relatively inflationary price system and that the original observations of 
the Department must be corrected. When New England Telephone argued 
that the Department did not give sufficient effect to inflationary trends 
by asking that both the rate base and rate of return be adjusted, the 
Court answered in effect that the rate base was not the point at which 
to quibble about inflation. 101 With reference to rate of return, however, 
the Court had stated in an earlier case that the Department should not 
require "the cost of stock capital to be ascertained by reference to some 
supposedly normal period and in disregard of the stubborn facts existing 
in the period when the capital must be raised. . . .102 
Even if the Department is not tied to a "normal period," it still is 
trying to spot a trend by observing economic patterns at one specific point, 
and applying whatever projection of trends it can deduce from the history 
of costs for the particular utility. The Court, with its insistence upon the 
100 Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 690 106 N.E.2d 259, 265 (1952). 
101 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1617-18, 275 N.E.2d at 499-500. 
102 327 Mass. at 94, 97 N.E.2d at 516. 
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introduction of new evidence has a second, more recent point of reference, 
It may therefore construct a line with a slope and can interpret what 
the Department could only try to prophesy. But, as the Department 
report of 1971 Telephone case observed, "fair rate of return for this 
company is not one that changes from day to day or month to month. 
If adequate capital can be raised over reasonable time spans at reason-
able rates, the requirement of fairness is met."I03 
The Court and the Department both recognize that the Company's 
operations must be observed over a period of time if an accurate predic-
tion of the future of the utility is to be made. However, there is dis-
agreement over which observations are most valuable. The Department 
feels that conclusions drawn from observation of the general long-term 
operation of the Company are more accurate while the Court attaches 
greater weight to the events and forces surrounding the Company's de-
cision to ask for a new rate schedule. Each view has some merit. The 
Department's approach ena:bles it to penalize and control any long-term 
mismanagement of the utility. On the other hand, the Court's view 
addresses the problems encountered in a period of high inflation. 
It is suggested that the better way to deal with inflation is to insist 
on frequent Department reviews of the rate schedules and structures of 
utilities, particularly in an inflationary economic situation which may 
adversely affect their rate base and their ability to "hire" capital. If the 
Department were not emasculated by the Court's hospitality to appeals 
for confiscation, utility companies such as New England Telephone would 
then approach the Department more frequently for rate adjustments and 
the adjustments could be made with greater precision. At present, if the 
adjustment for inflation in the tariff schedule is excessive, the utilities 
may simply avoid rate hearings in order to continue making a substantial 
profit in a period of lesser inflation on rates which are predicated upon 
assumptions of relatively higher cr.nflationary rates. The adequacy of the 
rate structures should be examined more often for the benefit of all 
parties involved. 
IV. MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES 
The disagreement between the Department and the Court with regard 
to the treatment of an admitted inflation is reflected in other areas of 
the 1971 Telephone case. 'J1he most significant of these areas is the basic 
disagreement between the Department and the Court over the role of 
the Department in overseeing management decisions. In the 1971 rate 
case the disagreements between the Department and the Court con-
cerned the use of a hypothetical rate base and the inclusion of expenses 
in the years after the test year (which the Department was charged with 
103 Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130, 149 (Mass. Dept. of 
Pub. Util. 1970). 
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knowing) in the determination of the overall rates.104 The Department 
had attempted to explain its interest in the management of New England 
Telephone in the following manner: 
"That return, [the Massachusetts decisional standards of a fair rate 
of return required for a company to earn the cost of its capital] more-
over, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity 
of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." 
Implicit in this standard, however, is a requirement that t!he com-
pany management must operate the company upon a reasonably 
economic basis. The company is not guaranteed a fair rate of return. 
It is entitled to charge rates which will produce a fair rate of return 
if the business is conducted in a manner in which the public may 
reasonably expect it to be managed. l1he department cannot dictate 
financial policy to the management. On the other hand, if manage-
ment elects an uneconomic fiscal policy, the fair rate of return does 
not require that the company be compensated for the extra costs 
caused by its uneconomic policies.105 
Apparently the Department had not been impressed with the recent 
management decisions of New England Telephone. The Court quoted 
in its opinion three areas of dissatisfaction which the Department had 
registered: (1) failure of the Company to follow the judgment of the 
Department with regard to the proper debt ratio; (2) failure to elect 
liberalized depreciation under the Internal Revenue Code; (3) permitting 
the service level in Massachusetts to deteriorate markedly in the months 
preceding the rate hearings. lOG The Supreme Judicial Court was not 
persuaded, on the basis of its theory of management prerogative, that 
the reasons that the Department advanced for limiting the rate of return 
of New England Telephone should control.107 
Since the Court had permitted the application of hypothetical capital 
ratios in the 1951 and 1954 Telephone cases it became necessary for the 
Court to distinguish the refusal to use hypothetical ratios in the present 
case. In the 1951 Telephone case, New England Telephone proposed to 
go from a 62% debt ratio to a 33 1/3% debt ratio in a short space of 
time. The Department disagreed with the Company and claimed that a. 
better reduction of debt would be to a position of 45%.108 The Court 
agreed with the Department on this matter: 
We agree of course that a public regulatory board cannot assume the 
management of the company and cannot under the guise of rate 
making interfere in matters of business detail with the judgment of 
104 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1630-33, 1644-47,275 N.E.2d at 507-09, 515-17. 
105 84 P.U.R.3d at 140. 
106 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1642, 275 N.E.2d at 513-14. 
107 Id. 
108 327 Mass. at 90, 97 N.E.2d 514. 
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its officers reached in good faith and within the limits of a reasonable 
discretion. . . . [I]n this instance, in clle circumstances now existing 
and especially in proceeding upon the "cost of capital" theory, the 
debt ratio is not a matter of that kind .... [T]o say the department 
could not even consider debt ratio would be to blind its eyes to one 
of the elements in the problem before it .... Yet the evidence shows 
that such a decision under present conditions migtht well double or 
even triple the cost of new capital and increase correspondingly the 
burden laid upon the public for obtaining it.1oo 
The Court essentially felt that actions on the part of the management of 
the corporation, even though clley might be entirely worthy from the 
standpoint of loyalty to the corporation's interests on the part of the 
board of directors, might not be well considered from the point of view 
of the consuming pu:blic and therefore from the point of view of the 
Department.110 The Court observed that debt capital during the period 
involved with the rate making was very plentiful and inexpensive while 
the costs of raising capital through stock issues at that time were very 
high.111 The Department had decided that clle Company's choices were 
generally expensive for the consumer of the utility service and were not 
justified by any special exigencies. It therefore penalized the Company to 
some extent by attributing a higher than actual debt ratio, and this de-
cision was upheld by the Court in the 1951 Telephone case. 
In 1954, New England Telephone again argued that the prerogatives 
of management meant that the Department could not assign hypothetical 
debt ratios to the capital structure of the Company.ll2 The Department, 
on the other hand, argued that the Company had flagrantly disregarded 
the Department's recommendations for a proper ratio of debt to equity.ll3 
11he Court held that "[a]s a matter of internal management, the com-
pany's directors had the right to determine" the capital structure of the 
corporation,114 but the actual ratio in light of the circumstances before 
the Court could be considered something in the nature of a "company 
luxury."115 The Court again permitted tlhe Department to use a hypo-
thetical capital structure. In the 1971 New England Telephone case, 
however, the Court chose to distinguish the previous cases before it by 
applying the rule which had been established in Mystic Valley Gas Co. v. 
Department of Public Utilities. 116 In Mystic Valley the Court refuted the 
Department's claim that a hypothetical capital base should be used by 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 90-91, 97 N.E.2d at 514. 
111 Id. at 91, 97 N.E.2d at 514. 
112 New England Tel. & Tel. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities, 331 Mass. 604 618, 
121 N.E.2d 896, 904 (1954). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761, 269 N.E.2d 233. 
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suggesting that the circumstances surrounding the 1951 Telephone de-
cision had been unusual while the economics of the 1969-1970 period 
demanded forebearance on the part of the Department in order to fulfill 
its regulatory mandate. The new rule which the Court set out was: the 
Department may not disregard actual capital ratios "unless they so un-
reasonably and substantially vary from usual practice as to impose an 
unfair burden on the consumer."117 
The 1971 Telephone decision imposed no greater burden of responsi-
bility on management decisions of a regulated utility than on those of 
any other business corporation. However, it overlooks a very significant 
factor which distinguishes utilities from other industries, namely, that 
any decision by the utility with regard to its capital structure directly 
affects the cost of service to the public in a market which is devoid of 
competition. There ought to be a different standard of responsibility for 
obtaining capital for a utility. A company decision to enter the debt 
markets in an inflationary period, no matter how proper in terms of 
management prerogative, is a move which is guaranteed to produce 
higher overall capital costs since interest rates almost invariably rise 
during periods of inflation. If a company chooses to float debt during a 
period such as 1969-1970 where ,interest rates rose to a spectacularly 
high level in comparison to the preceding year of the 1960's and showed 
indications of remaining at a high level over a short run, a regulator may 
justifiably conclude that the decision is unreasonable, albeit entirely 
within its management rights. Consider, for example, the 1951 situation 
where the Company decided to shift from a 62% debt position to 
a 33 1/3% position and subsequently did so. The decision was well within 
~he Company's power, but the Court allowed the Department to question 
the business judgment of management and, in effect, to penalize manage-
ment by the imputing to the Company a more reasonable 45% hypo-
thetical debt ratio for rate setting purposes. The 1971 situation can be 
distinguished, perhaps, on the grounds that the difference between an 
actual debt ratio of 45% and the hypothetical one of 50% is not partic-
ularly large. However, the Department clearly expressed its sense that 
the Company's timing had been very poor since it chose an unfavorable 
time to go into the debt markets, costing the users of the utility service 
far more over a longer period of time (the life of the bond issue) than 
o~herwise would be the case. Only if New England Telephone could 
prove that it sorely needed additional capital in 1969-1970 should it 
have been allowed to pass on the increased costs of capital to the public. 
The Department concluded that the Company should have moved to a 
higher debt position at an earlier time When interest rates were lower, 
and the 50% hypothetical debt ratio reflected savings which would 
have been realized if the Company had followed that course of action. 
This decision by the Department stems from a general understanding 
117 Id. at 769, n.14, 269 N.E.2d at 239 n.14. 
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that New England Telephone, as part of the Bell System, has problems 
similar to the Bell System in obtaining financing for itself. The general 
problem of the whole system is that the parent corporation, (American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co.) and most of its subsidiaries have been 
to the capital markets too often in the years after World War II. Bond 
and stock issues of the various Bell System companies are very widely 
represented in many different portfolios. The Bell System in general 
(which tended to act as a unit vis-a-vis financial matters in the past) 118 
has issued a large variety of debt securities in order to secure capital, 
even stooping to the issuance of warrants, which have been described 
as the "savings stamps of security financing."1l9 The sheer quantity and 
frequency of such issues have produced understandable fears of market 
saturation. If New England Telephone had been able to prove that it was 
afflicted with the problems generally assigned to the Bell System and its 
subsidiaries in procuring capital, then the Company's decision to shift to 
a 45% debt ratio at that time would not appear unreasonable,120 and the 
Court's decision in the 1971 Telephone case would be correct. However, 
in the absence of suoh proof, there is a problem in defining whose usual 
practice it is to increase debt figures during high interest periods. Is New 
England Telephone here to be compared with the average industrial 
company (which would rarely have an Aaa rating if carrying 45% debt), 
with other utilities (whose debt ratios tend to be considerably higher on 
the average), or with another regional telephone company (with different 
expansion and capital needs predicated on the uniqueness of the region) ? 
Comparison to other industries and utilities is very difficult in the case 
of a telephone utility,121 The comparison is especially difficult in light of 
the standard which the Court has said the Department must consider, 
namely, whether the behavior of the regulated company has placed an 
unreasonable financial burden upon the consumer of the utility. By deter-
mining that the Department cannot posit a hypothetical capital ratio on 
the grounds I'hat the Department is invading the company's managerial 
prerogative the Court has itself invaded the province of the Department 
of Public Utilities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regulation of public utilities in Massachusetts developed under a 
statute which allowed review by the Supreme Judicial Court of both 
law and fact. Later, the Court held that due process considerations flow-
ing from the Declaration of Rights meant that review by t.<he Court of 
118 Rose, The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases, 37 Va. L. Rev. 699, 719-20 
(1951) . 
119 Welch, Outlook on Utility Rates and Finances, 91 Pub. Utility Fortnightly 
11, 16 (Jan. 4, 1973). 
120 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1633, 275 N.E.2d at 508-9. 
121 CE. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 
(1969); Bonbright. 
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both law and fact under a constitutional standard rather than a sub-
stantial evidence standard was necessary to prevent confiscation of a 
utility's property in the public service. The existence of the appeals 
statute was immaterial. The essential immateriality of the statute granting 
review in regulatory cases has been demonstrated by rhe 1971 Telephone 
decision, despite extensive revision of the appeals statute in 1953. This 
revision was designed to control the problems arising out of the Court's 
interpretation of judicial review under the original statute in the Lowell 
Gas case of 1949. Since the Court's interpretation is founded on the 
Declaration of Rights, little can be done statutorily to relieve the interpre-
tation which effectively emasculates the Department of Public Utilities 
in its statutory duties of overseeing the conduct and rates of public 
utilities in Massachusetts. 
The Court's policy of review of facts has led it to frequently pass on 
the proper level of rate of return upon capital invested for the produc-
tion of public services. This, in effect, is rate making. Furthermore, this 
willingness to review fact as well as law is a powerful incentive toward 
appeal which aggravates the problems of rate regulation in an inflationary 
context, since the appeals process consumes time and accentuates the 
slippage of revenues due to inflation. Since the rate set by any regulator 
is a figure designed to average out over a period of years (a higher 
return at the beginning if one assumes inflation and company expansion 
offset by a lower return later), the introduction of new evidence before 
the Court throws off the averaging process. The Department, at a dis-
advantage in forecasting because it obviously does not know the contours 
of the future, is liable to be reversed by the Court. The Department of 
Public Utilities is thus deprived of discretion which it should have to 
balance the utilities' desire for profits against the interests of the con-
suming public. 
The 1971 Telephone case also illustrates the extent to which inter-
ference witlh internal corporate decision-making will be tolerated to 
achieve utility compliance with standards which the Court may wish to 
see in the areas of financial management, overall company efficiency and 
provision of adequate public service. The Department has a legislative 
mandate to oversee utilities. However, its discretion is severely confined 
under the present decisional standards because the Court has stated that 
managerial prerogative may be questioned only when unreasonable; the 
Court forgets that what may be unreasonable for a public utility because 
of the nature of its mandate to serve the public may not be unreasonable 
in other corporate settings. Barred from effectively setting rates, the De-
partment is also prevented from guiding utility operations through con-
sideration of both public and private interests. 
The Court, despite protestations to the contrary, has installed itself 
in the business of rate making. Although public utility rate making may 
not warrant any particular expertise, the General Court did establish 
the Department of Public Utilities with the intention that it develop 
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expertise in the detennination of a proper balance between public and 
corporate interests. The Court, therefore, has stepped into the role of the 
Department and applied its standards of rate detenninatioo; it has 
thereby created an inconsistent system which, in the long run, hurts the 
public. 
JANE M. JOZEFEK 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 26
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/26
